Cryptographic identity
The CPID, the key hierarchy, issuance and validation, and the verification material any relying party can fetch.
Persistent identifier. Short-lived proof. Continuous status.
The CPID is persistent, non-secret and globally unique. It carries no names, no email addresses, no citizen identifiers and no mission detail — identity claims live in the signed passport, where access, retention and disclosure policy can reach them.
What proves control of a CPID is separate and deliberately fragile: a signed, audience-bound, single-use credential that expires in minutes.
- Issuer
- Solarion AI Systems ™
- Technical issuer id
- solarion-ai-systems
- Tenant id
- t-04a48908d600
- Object type
- agent · model · workload · compute · tool · policy · evidence
- Unique value
- UUIDv7 — time-ordered, 128-bit
Do not encode names, email addresses, citizen identifiers, mission details or customer data in a CPID. The tenant segment is an opaque value for exactly this reason.
Four tiers, so a compromise at one level does not become a compromise of the trust domain.
Root trust key
Offline or HSM-protected. Signs tenant issuer certificates. Root operations require quorum and immutable audit.
Tenant issuer
One trust boundary per tenant. Signs passport keys, and is the key relying parties resolve.
Passport key
Signs the CPID credential and the policy binding attached to it.
Runtime key
Ephemeral proof for one task or session. Minutes, not months.
Register
Owner, purpose, object.
Attest
Workload or key context.
Issue
Signed passport.
Present
Passport and token.
Verify
Signature, status, policy.
Enforce
Permit, restrict or revoke.
- Algorithm
- ES256
- Issuer key id
- issuer-fa94e2712ecd23c9
- Thumbprint
- fa94e2712ecd23c9393ec1a628c0484672c5102c3d139e80f583452a2aa1a1b1
- Verification
- Fetch the JWKS →
- Properties
- JWS signatures; audience and nonce binding; expiry; replay detection; key rotation; algorithm agility.
This build generates and holds its signing keys in software on the host. Signatures are real and verifiable, but the custody model is not production-grade: production requires HSM or KMS custody, offline root operations, quorum for root actions and independent cryptographic review.